We exhibit canonical Choice maps within categorical theories of Primitive Recursion, of partially defined PR maps, as well as for classical, quantifier defined PR theories, and show incompatibility of these choice sections in the latter theories, with (iterative) finite-descent property of ω ω , namely within a "minimal" such quantor defined Arithmetic, Q. This is to give inconsistency of ZF, and even of first order set theory 1ZF strengthened by well-order property of ω ω . The argument is iterative evaluation of PR map codes, which gets epimorphic defined-arguments enumeration by above finite-descent property. This enumeration is turned into a retraction by AC, with PR section in Q + = Q + wo(ω ω ), and so makes the evaluation a PR map. But the latter is excluded by Ackermann's result that such (diagonalised) evaluation grows faster than any PR map within any consistent frame.
Introduction
We begin with Proof of a local, middle-inverse form of -Countable -Choice, for fundamental Free-Variables (categorical) Theory PR, as well as for Theory P R A = PR A of partial maps over Theory PR A = PR + (abstr) of Primitive Recursion with predicate abstraction χ : A → 2 → Object {A | χ}. This -equational -Axiom is preserved by theory strengthening. Admissibility of AC for Theory PR A itself remains open.
What we can prove is "even" middle inverse form ACC mi of AC, for "classically" quantified Arithmetical Theory Q = PR A + ∀∃!, having 0 this is part 4 of a cycle on Recursive Categorical Foundations, we rely on RCF 1 and section 2 of RCF 2 0 legend of logo: AC : Axiom of Choice, ∀∃! : Discrete map definition by " ∀ a ∃! b ϕ(a, b) ", ε : Iterative evaluation of PR A map codes, PR A the Theory of Primitive Recursion with predicate abstraction * TU Berlin, Mathematik, pfender@math.tu-berlin.de † last revised September 9, 2009 (possibility of) "discrete" map-definition, via left-total, right-unique binary predicates ϕ = ϕ(a, b) : A × B → 2, a possibility for map-definition typical for set theory (and its strengthenings.) For Ordinal O : = N[ω] ⊂ ω ω we recall schema (π) = (π O ) of finite descent for Complexity Controlled Iterations "over" O, and definition of strengthening πR = PR A + (π) of PR A : Within πR the definedarguments enumerations of the CCI O 's are forced to become epi, "onto": These CCI O 's on-terminate within Theory πR, in particular so does formally partial -iterative -code evaluation of Theory πR, cf. part RCF 2.
Defined by a CCI O , evaluation ε becomes epi within "critical" theory Q + = Q + wo(ω ω ), and therefore gets a section within Q, of special form, namely defined by µ-operator, whence as a partially defined mapḋ ε . But Section Lemma shows that such a partially defined PR section is in fact a "total" PR map, d ′ ε . This makes ε itself into a PR map
But this is excluded -within any consistent arithmetical theoryby Ackermann's result that (diagonalised) evaluation grows faster than any PR map. So Theory Q + turns out to inconsistent. The same then applies to first order set theory 1ZF + wo(ω ω ) with ω ω well-ordered -it is an extension of Q + -and then to set theory ZF itself, since ZF has ω ω well-ordered and so is an extension of inconsistent theory 1ZF + wo(ω ω ).
2 Middle-Inverse Choice Maps in Theories PR and P R A Definition: For a given map
If the given T map f : A ։ B is a T-epi, then obviously f ′ : B A is a T-section for f.
Definition: A (categorical) Theory T with terminal Object ½ -or at least a half-terminal Object ½ : Each Object A admits a (non-necessary unique) T-map ! : A → ½ -is said to admit (middle-inverse) Choice, or to satisfy Axiom AC mi if each T map f : A → B coming with a point a 0 : ½ → A, admits a middle inverse map f ′ : B → A in the sense above.
Remarks:
-If T satisfies AC mi , then each "pointed" T-epi is a retraction:
T satisfies the (local) Axiom of Choice AC. And -dually -each pointed T-mono then is a section.
-In set theories, requirement of pointed Domains seems to be redundant, since non-empty sets have points, by extensionality axiom. But are these points available for "construction" below, without (set-theoretical) axiom of Choice?
Countable Choice Theorem for PR and P R A : (ii) Theory P R A , of partial PR maps over basic Theory PR A = PR + (abstr) of Primitive Recursion with predicate abstraction, again admits axiom ACC of (Countable) Choice, in the form of middleinverse (partial) maps to arbitrary partial maps.
(iii) Middle-inverse form AC mi of AC is clearly inherited by strengthenings of a theory, because of its purely equational character: To each map is associated a map in the converse direction, with "characteristic" middle-inverse equation maintained.
(iv) Problem: Does Theory PR A "itself" admit AC?
Use of AC in its epis-have-sections form cannot be inherited by PR A from P R A since PR A epis are a priori not P R A epis: a "direct" proof would need PR A p.b.'s to pull back epis into epis, and this is excluded in general, by an argument discussed in part RCF 2.
Proof of assertion (i) by recursive case distinction on the structure of f : A → B in PR, A, B fundamental, i. e. of form of a (binary bracketed) finite power of object N : -Case of map-constants: All of these come with retractions or with sections, in particular since each of the fundamental (!) Objects A comes with a (componentwise defined) zero 0 A : ½ → A.
Proof of assertion (ii): middle-inverse Choice for Theory P R A :
A ⇀ B within PR A , we could choose middle-inverse just (graph-) opposite to f, namely
But wanted proof of middle-innverse property
is more conceptual -and simpler -if we use definition of partial maps inside PR A via µ-recursion, cf. RCF 1: We define our middle-inverse candidate g = g(b) : B ⇀ A in µR ∼ = P R A as follows, (essentially) via a (partial) µR-map
this with respect to canonical, Cantor ordering of Object
This g : B ⇀ A is a middle-inverse to f : A ⇀ B, since -preliminary result:
In order to get rid of the leading d f : D f → A on both sides of the (resulting) P R A equation above, we use the commuting P R A Basic Partial Map diagram of Structure Theorem for P R A out of RCF 1:
In fact, with both "structural" P R A equations of the diagram, we get from our P R A equation:
Choice within Classically Quantified Arithmetics
A → 2 by (forced) Cartesianness -and by map-definition via (formal) unique existence of values to given arguments. This gives the following additional schemata for "minimal classical" (categorical) Theory Q, first it gives the "quantified" law of excluded middle:
as well as Map definition by unique existence:
[ Unique existence is formalised as usual by a Free-Variables implication between maps.] (∀∃!)
gives rise to a unique map
Forgoing schema (including its uniqueness clause) then gives -for all Q maps f, g : A → B :
-argumentwise definition of map-equality:
We state one basic property of "sets like" Theory Q :
Epi=Surj Lemma: Q's epis are just its surjective maps. The well-known proof of this fact in set theory obviously carries over to present context Q.
Middle-Inverse Countable-Choice Theorem for Theory Q : Q -and "then" all its strengthenings -fullfill (pointed) schema ACC mi of middle-inverse Choice ACC mi : Each Q map f : A → B coming with point a 0 : ½ → A, gives rise to a Q map f ′ : B → A such that
Proof: Define middle-inverse map
= b} : B ⇀ N, and count A = count A (n) : N → A is the "canonical" retractive count of (PR A ) Object A, constructable as such in particular by use of point
In particular since the second case of definition of f ′ : B → A does not arise when composed f • f ′ • f : A → B → A → B, this composition -"regular" case -gives in fact back map f : A → B q.e.d.
Middle-Inverse Remarks:
(i) Implicitely we have used here Q map definition, of middle-inverse f ′ , via left-total right-unique predicate: all cases b ∈ B are covered -otherwise clause -and (partial) µ f and hence count A • µ f : B ⇀ N → A, are right-unique. "But" for this definition of f ′ to give in fact a map, we have used the special property of Q that its quantifiers, here " ∃ ", turn totally defined predicates into totally defined ones: without that property, f ′ -with its "otherwise" clause in its definition -would not become legitimately a map within the theory.
(ii) Dangerous bound:
(iii) ∀∃! Remark: 1 For our argument we may replace schema (∀∃!) above by Free-Variables based Schema of map definition by unique value-existence, namely:
So the critical properties of Q are those of its existential quantification: first: this quantification yields total predicates, in the formal sense that it leads never out of Cartesianness, and second: it allows -by shear (established) formal existence of "values" -definition of maps via (even "infinit") argument/value tables.
Complexity Controlled Iteration Recalled
Complexity Controlled Iteration -CCI O -is Iteration of a predecessor (endo) step, decreasing Complexity of argument -Complexity measured in (a given) Ordinal O -as long as complexity zero is not "yet" reached. Result then is the argument reached, with complexity zero. We choose here axis case O : = N[ω] ⊂ ω ω , the set of polynomial coefficient strings: no trailing zeros.
It is highly plausible, and a Theorem in PA -at least in PA + well-order of ω ω -, that such CCI's terminate, on each initial argument given. So our first step in direction of Terminating Recursivenessstrengthening PR A -can (and will) be formalisation first of the concept CCI of Complexity Controlled Iteration ("over" O : = N[ω]) andsecond -introduction of axiom schema for conceiving weakest Theory πR (strengthening PR A and) admitting termination of all these CCI's.
We attempt to formalise wanted Theory within the partial-map framework of theory P R A ⊐ PR A , which is a definitional, conservative extension of Theory PR A . It contains (Cartesian) PR A embedded as a monoidal PR subCategory. 
is the partial map realising the CCI (as a while loop), and has defined arguments enumeration
A ⇀ N, and as such characterised -as partial map: within S -by
) . = 0, and
Intuitively, we would expect here d • d − = id A , but this is here just the formal problem:
Can we get -at least by (consistent?) axiom -defined-arguments enumeration
to become a retraction, within S, with section taken
A ⇀ D above? This question will be the subject below.
Forcing evaluation to classically become PR
We "question" here -on consistency -Theory Q + = def Q+wo(ω ω ) = by def PR A + ∀∃! + wo(ω ω ), of classically quantified Arithmetic with wellordered ω ω , a subsystem of set theory ZF.
Our argument against consistency of Q + will be that ACC (available) for this theory turns defined-arguments enumeration d ε for iterative PR map code evaluation into a retraction, "then" with PR section within Q + . For fixing ideas, recall from RCF 2: 
By Basic Descent Lemma of RCF 2, complexity above strictly decreases (in the order of O : = N[ω]) as long as complexity zero is not "yet" reached, hence ε is defined as a CCI O , a Complexity Controlled Iteration "over" O. By axiom (π), inferred within Theory Q + by (constituting) well-order wo(ω ω ), enumeration d ε : D ε → PR A × is epi in Q + . By ACC and the special kind of (middle-inverse) Choice maps of Q (and hence of strengthening Q + ), this epi gets a section within Q + , of forṁ
Now µ-recursive (formally partial) maps are the same as P R A maps, see RCF 1. So µ-recursive mapḋ ε : PR A × ⇀ D ε above can be viewed as a P R A map, section to PR A map d ε : D ε → PR A × . So in particular, partialḋ ε is a section to PR A map d ε within Theory S, where S is the restriction S : = Q + ↾ PR A of Q + to PR A , in fact a strengthening of PR A , as required for application of Section Lemma below. Second assertion of this Lemma, applied to d ε and its P R A section within S, gives in fact a
But this implies for evaluation ε : PR A × ⇀ , within frame S (which strengthens Theory P R A ):
the latter by Structure Theorem for P R A .
This way evaluation ε : PR A × → becomes (represented as) a PR A map within Theory S : = Q + ↾ PR A strengthening PR A .
On the other hand, our (iterative) evaluation does with "concrete" codes what it should do, it is Objective in the following sense:
Here f : ½ → ⌈A, B⌉ PR A ⊂ PR A is the "concrete" code, e.g. the L A T E X code, of given map f.
But no consistent strengthening S of Theory PR A can admit such an (Objective) self-evaluation: Ackermann's diagonalisation of an (as such Objective) PR map-code evaluation -diagonalisation grosso modo: evaluate n-th (unary) PR map code at argument n -(eventually) grows faster than any PR map.
So Theory S : = Q + ↾ PR A as well as its extension Q + itself, cannot be consistent.
For Proof (above) of this inconsistency result, we have used Section Lemma for theorie(s) S strengthening PR A :
A ⇀ B ⇀ C, when giving an (embedded) S map h : A → C, is itself an (embedded) S map, i. e. S-equal to a PR A map (term), slogan: a first composition factor of a total map is total.
(ii) So in particular each section ("coretraction") of theory S has a representation as an S map, a fortiori: each S section of a PR A map belongs to S, has a S representation as a PR A map (term), primitive recursive as such.
(iii) Since µ-recursive maps are "the same" as partial PR ones -see RFC 1 -each µ-recursive section of a PR A map "is" in fact a PR A map, this within S, Theory S any strengthening of PR A .
Proof [ necessary just of first assertion ] : For f : A ⇀ B, g : B ⇀ C given in the assertion, considerwith the usual notation for defined-arguments enumerations and rules -diagram below, showing their "total" (embedded) composition result
[ This diagram just enriches S composition diagram for f : A ⇀ B and g : B ⇀ C, by the S data of S map h : A → C, and comparison
of a Cartesian PR Theory T within Theory T which is Objective as self-evaluation -see above -establishes a contradiction within T, by the ("usual") diagonal argument below: formalisation of "Antinomie Richard".
[ We will apply this argument here to theory Q + ↾ PR A (and its extensions.) In present context we rely -earlier: on Basic Descent Lemma for iterative evaluation -, and here (just) on this Objectivity of evaluation: that Objectivity has a comparatively simple proof, but a proof on two levels: it is PR on the meta level, level of map terms f in PR A (A, B) ⊂ PR A ⊂ N, including an Objective-PR argument in case of an iterated f = g § in PR A (A × N, A) , Objective Primitive Recursion taken on iteration count n ∈ N in that iteration case.]
Remains to develop the diagonal argument "against" (consistent) code self-evaluation for Theory T in general -skip, if you are used to such diagonal argument -, same argument as in RCF 3: Map-Code Interpretation via Closure.
In presence of such (Objective) self-evaluation family ε define (anti) diagonal d : N → 2 within general Cartesian Arithmetical theory T :
As expected in such diagonal argument, we substitute -within Theory T -the counting index
a contradiction, whence:
Conclusion: Theory Q + ↾ PR A is in fact inconsistent, and so are its extensions, among them set theory ZF "again", but already Theory Consider just the "concrete" case of (iterative) PR map-code evaluation ε : Here ACC would give a section to epimorphic -this by axiom (π) -PR defined-arguments enumeration ((u, a) , n) = by def (u, a) : D ε → PR A × , D ε = by def {((u, a), n) | c ℓ e n (u, a) . = 0}.
If such a section can be brought into µ-recursive form, "i. e." if for µ-recursive (partial) map -it is always available -µ ε = µ ε (u, a) = def µ{n | c ℓ e n (u, a) . = 0} : PR A × ⇀ N, P R A maṗ d ε =ḋ ε (u, a) = by def ((u, a), µ ε (u, a)) : PR A × ⇀ D ε is in fact a section for d ε , i. e. if T ⊢ c ℓ e µε(u,a) (u, a) = 0, then T is necessarily inconsistent, by our arguments above: by section Lemma for T ↾ PR A , this -partial PR -section d ε would become PR and would make P R A evaluation map ε : PR A × ⇀ Primitive Recursive. But for a general T-section (here to d ε ) Section Lemma does a priori not apply, since -diagram in its proof -comparison map j : A → D g b • f for T equality h = g • f is now just a T map, not necessarily a PR A map (term).
Conclusion:
Our argumenation above excludes for consistency of extensions of theories π O R not ("yet?") AC in general, but "only" availability of sections in µ-recursive form, i. e. in particular (formally partial) PR map µ ε : PR A × ⇀ N (successfully) witnessing termination c ℓ e µε(u,a) = 0 of iteration ε.
Problem: Does our inconsistency argument equally apply to first order Elementary Theory of Topoi 1ETT + NNO + wo(ω ω ) with NNO and well-ordered ω ω ?
As far as I can see, our argument can be adapted to this case, if definition (•) above of the middle-inverse f ′ : B → A to a map f : A → B, with its case distinction involving "now" intuitionistic existential quantification -as well as a partial µ-recursive map -is a legitimate map definition within that theory.
